Senate Hearing on Maritime & Sovereignty Disputes in Asia

July 15, 2009

Opening Remarks by Senator Webb’s 

Good afternoon, the hearing will come to order. In this first oversight hearing of the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee in the 111th Congress, we will examine maritime territorial disputes in Asia and how sovereignty issues are impacting the region and U.S. interests.

No other topic brings into light the enormous and complex challenges facing the United States in Asia.

At the pinnacle of this issue is China’s growing military, diplomatic and economic power, not only in the region but world-wide. China's evolution has changed the regional economic balance, and has enabled China to expand its political influence. Across the East Asian mainland, from Burma to Vietnam, we have heard statements of concern about the impact of China’s reach.

As the United States continues its attempt to isolate Burma due to the human rights policies of its military regime, China's influence has grown exponentially, including the recent announcement of a multi-billion dollar oil pipeline project that would enable the Chinese to offload oil obtained in the Persian Gulf and pump it to Yunnan Province, without having to transit the choke point of the Strait of Malacca.

In Vietnam, this past January General Vo Nguyen Giap, commander-in-chief for the Vietnam People’s Army during the Vietnam War and former defense minister, sent an open letter to the Vietnamese government. He called for a halt to a huge, mulit-billion dollar Chinese bauxite mining project in Vietnam's central highlands, citing environmental damage, harm to ethnic minorities, and—most importantly—a threat to Vietnam's national security.

Importantly, China is seeking not only to expand its economic and political influence, but also to expand its territory. China’s military modernization has directly supported this endeavor. The PLA Navy is developing “blue water” capabilities that will enable it to project power into the region and beyond. China today has 241 principal combatant warships in its Navy, including 60 submarines, and the Department of Defense reported earlier this year that “[t]he PLA Navy is considering building multiple [aircraft] carriers by 2020.” In addition to the construction of aircraft carriers, the PLA Navy has been rapidly modernizing its submarine fleet and surface combatants to enhance its ability to project power far from its coast. This poses a significant threat to the current geostrategic balance in Asia.

Of particular concern are China’s sovereignty claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea. At the forefront of these disputes is Taiwan. However the attention to this potential conflict has obscured attention to other disputes in the region.

China also lays claim to the Senkaku Islands, Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands. Despite Japan’s control over the Senkaku Islands since the end of World War II—and the recognition by others, including the United States, of Japan’s sovereignty over these islands—China still claims publicly its sovereignty over the Senkakus. Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party has never officially recognized Japan’s sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands, which includes Okinawa.

In the South China Sea, a myriad of unresolved disputes involve several island groups claimed in whole or part by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei. Key claims focus on the Spratly Islands, composed of 21 islands and atolls, 50 submerged land atolls, and 28 partly submerged reefs. Their total land mass is small, but they spread out over 340,000 square miles. China and Vietnam also claim the Paracels, a smaller group of islands located south of China’s Hainan Island.

These disputes seriously impact third countries in the region, and it is important to point out that only United States has both the stature and the national power to confront the obvious imbalance of power that China brings to these situations. In that regard, we have an obligation to do so if we wish to maintain a geostrategic balance in the region that ensures fairness for every nation in Asia, and protects the voice of every country seeking a peaceful resolution to their disputes. The participation of the United States in these disputes also affects how these countries perceive threats in their regional environment, and what options they may have available to them as they seek to protect their interests. China has demonstrated its willingness to display its new military capabilities and at times to use force to claim maritime territory. In response, other countries in the region are modernizing their naval capabilities, such as Vietnam’s decision to purchase six Kilo-class submarines from Russia.

Additionally, many observers note that China’s pattern of intimidation may hinder free and fair economic development in the region. For example, China’s recent detention of Vietnamese fisherman near the Paracel Islands and its overt threats to U.S. oil companies operating in the South China Sea highlight the increased risks to shipping and fishing and the limited prospects resource exploitation. These actions left unanswered may threaten the well-being of the region.

These disputes also significantly affect the United States by endangering regional peace and security. As the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis demonstrates, the United States is the only world power capable of responding to aggressive and intimidating acts by China. In looking at recent events, it appears the United States is responding to maritime incidents as singular tactical challenges, while China appears to be acting with a strategic vision. These troubling events include the EP-3 crisis in 2001, the surfacing of a Chinese submarine in the midst of the USS Kitty Hawk carrier group in 2006, the harassment of the USNS Impeccable in March this year, and the collision of a Chinese sub with the USS John McCain’s sonar cable just last month. I am interested to hear our witnesses’ thoughts on how the United States should respond to these incidents.

As a maritime nation, the United States should maintain the quality and strength of its seapower—if not improve it. The recent trajectory of American seapower is not encouraging. When I first joined the U.S. Marine Corps in 1968, there were 931 combatants in the U.S. Navy. When I served as Secretary of the Navy in 1988, this battle force numbered 569 ships. At present, the U.S. Navy has 284 deployable battle force ships, with 42 percent of them underway today. Although the quality of China’s 241 ships cannot match that of the United States’, that quality gap is closing.

If the United States is to remain an Asian nation, and a maritime nation, our nation’s leaders have a choice to make. Our diplomatic corps and our military—and especially our Navy—must have the resources necessary to protect U.S. interests and the interests of our allies. Smart power must be reinforced by military might.

To reflect the complexity of maritime disputes in Asia, today’s hearing will have two panels. I’d like to extend my thanks to the Administration for having Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel from the State Department and Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Scher of the Defense Department to provide the Administration’s perspective on these issues. In addition, we have three well-qualified witnesses in our second panel to expound upon the strategic and economic impacts of these disputes. Thank you all for being here today and I look forward to your remarks.